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Non-technical summary 
There has been a lot of discussion among scholars and business leaders whether 
it is beneficial for a firm to be the first to bring an innovation to the market (“first 
mover”) or to wait until someone else does and than imitate the new products or 
services (“follower”). No clear cut answer has been provided for this question. 
There is evidence that first movers outperform followers, but cases have been 
found for which the opposite is true. Many factors influencing the decision to 
become a first mover or a follower have been identified in the relevant literature. 
First mover advantages can arise in the form of learning curve effects or a tempo-
rary monopoly in utilizing a new technology. Switching costs for buyers from the 
first mover to a potential follower are also given as a reason why first movers 
have an advantage over followers. There are however also disadvantages of mov-
ing first or rather advantages of being a follower: Followers are able to free ride 
on the investment of the first mover, profit from the resolution of technological 
and market uncertainty and may not experience the “incumbent inertia” which 
sometimes hampers innovative activities of first movers. The literature on first 
movers has not only identified the potential advantages and disadvantages of first 
movers but also the specific factors at the firm and industry-level that either 
hamper the realization of these advantages or leverage them. 
In our analysis we try to investigate empirically how these factors influence the 
decision to become a first-mover or a follower. What we focus on is not the stra-
tegic position a firm currently assumes but rather on the strategy of the firm. 
While we can not observe the former (whether a company actually pioneers a 
new product) we can observe the latter (whether a company’s strategic goal is to 
be first in new products in its industry). In addition to that we want to shed light 
on the interesting interplay between the firm and the industry it operates in de-
termining the decision to become a first mover. 
Using data from the Mannheim Innovationpanel of 2003 and analysing actual 
not best practices we find that firms that choose a first mover strategy operate in 
industries with intensive knowledge exchange, additionally leveraging this ad-
vantage through excellent absorptive capacities. It might very well be that these 
companies find themselves on the forefront of innovation with no one else to 
wait for. 
On the follower side we identify companies that operate in industries with a 
lack of external knowledge spillovers to benefit from. This environment, in com-
bination with underdeveloped absorptive capacities, prevents them from going it 
alone and instead favors a “wait and see” approach. In order to compete, they do 
not so much rely on external information sources as on internal operational excel-
lence and efficiency. This allows them to compete on lower costs once an adven-
turous first mover has sufficiently reduced uncertainty in the industry. 
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There appears to be an ambivalent dimension in innovation strategies: timing. 
When is an innovation ready for the market or when is the market ready for the 
innovation? This paper empirically investigates the determinants of a firm’s deci-
sion to become a first mover or a follower in innovation strategies. Much of theo-
retical and empirical work has focused on whether first mover strategies pay off 
or not. Here we take a different approach by analysing the determinants that lead 
companies to opt for either a first mover or a follower strategy. One of this pa-
per’s major goals is to distinguish between firm and industry specific effects on 
this particular strategic choice. We estimate our model using the most recent data 
from the German innovation survey of 2003. This dataset allows us to identify 
deliberate followers rather than outstripped first movers. One of our main find-
ings is that firms choosing a first mover strategy operate in industries with inten-
sive knowledge exchange and further leverage this advantage through excellent 
internal absorptive capacities. Followers, though, compete by way of their opera-
tional excellence for streamlining processes and cutting costs. Hence, we argue 
that neither of these two innovation strategies is per se superior to the other. 
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1  Introduction 
When it comes to new and exciting but less strategically tangible business oppor-
tunities like the internet or China we tend to hear about the enormous advantages 
of being fast - leaving competitors behind. Before the e-commerce bubble burst 
we were told what mattered was being first, not necessarily best, to succeed 
(Economist, 2002). Regarding China, we already hear that the “first-mover ad-
vantage has often turned into first-mover curse” ( Economist, 2004). Why do 
companies still choose first mover strategies? And why do some firms shy away 
from the alleged wisdom of being first and concentrate on follower strategies 
once others have opened up new markets? This paper aims to contribute compre-
hensive answers to these questions on a solid empirical basis. 
 
The important role of imitation in spreading new products, processes and organ-
isational practises within an economy has most prominently been outlined by 
Schumpeter (1942). Nevertheless, he also already pointed towards imitations’ 
Janus face: the prospect of imitation is a disincentive for innovation while imita-
tion is also a driving force in fostering fresh innovation. On the firm level a lot of 
research was focussed on the occurrence and sustainability of first mover and 
follower advantages, respectively. There is substantial evidence for both posi-
tions best  summarized by  Kerin et al. (1992) and  VanderWerf and Mahon 
(1997). The latter find that first mover advantages are more likely to be encoun-
tered if market shares are used to assess performance, as exemplified by Urban et 
al. (1986) in consumer product brands or Dos Santos and Peffers (1995) in the 
ATM business. Stories of successful pioneers might be intriguing but they may 
only be the notable tip of an otherwise invisible iceberg of failed first movers; or 
as Bolton (1993) puts it: “The economic landscape is littered with the bones of 
bankrupt innovators.” 
While there has been some methodological critique brought forward by Golder 
and Tellis (1993) on studies that identify first mover advantages (the frequently 
used PIMS database includes only survivors, relies on self classification of pio-
neers and is somewhat unreliable in defining a pioneer) there is also a bulk of 
academic work that identifies superior late mover or follower advantages. 
Among others, Boulding and Christen (2003) find a first mover profit disadvan-
tage, Bryman (1997) shows in a historical case study that late entrants survive 
more frequently in the US animation industry and Schnaars (1994) draws a long 
list of 28 product categories, ranging from light beer to commercial jet aircrafts, 
in which followers outperformed first movers. In essence, the jury is still out on 
whether pioneering firms can harvest the benefits of their first moves or if smart 
followers are eventually better off. 
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This uncertainty in the outcomes of first mover or follower strategies is the start-
ing point for our analysis. We try to tackle the issue from a different perspective 
by distinguishing between strategic position and strategy. While we can not ob-
serve the former (whether a company actually pioneers a new product) we can 
observe the latter (whether a company’s strategic goal is to be first in new prod-
ucts in its industry). This is all the more important in the follower segment, 
where we can focus on firms that deliberately choose to react only once a com-
petitor has made its first move (follower strategy) rather than treating firms with 
a first mover strategy that came in second as legitimate followers. Hence, we are 
not seeking to tender another study on whether first mover strategies pay off or 
not. We rather contribute to questions on the mechanisms that let companies opt 
for a first mover or a follower strategy. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out 
that this approach investigates actual not best practises. We consider the former a 
necessary building block to investigate the latter. We acknowledge that for the 
development of comprehensive management recommendations a combination of 
both concepts would be required.  Still, this endeavour would go beyond the 
scope of this paper. Hence, we limit our analysis and subsequent conclusions at 
this point to the actual strategic choices. Exploring optimal choices is a subject 
for future work. 
 
Our somewhat distinct setup also allows us to deviate from the analytical frame-
works of most of the studies mentioned above. We do not rely on a case study 
approach, nor do we choose a particular industry perspective. Instead, we rely on 
empirical analysis and using a large sample of almost 2,300 German companies 
from both the manufacturing and service sectors. This allows us to draw more in-
depth conclusions and distinguish between firm specific and industry  specific 
effects. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The subsequent chapter outlines major theo-
retical terms and concepts in greater detail. Chapter 3 focuses on the empirical 
implementation of the analysis, while Chapter 4 summarizes the results. Chapter 
5 eventually presents our conclusions. 
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2  Theoretical framework 
Lowe and Atkins (1994) define a first mover as a company “being the first (or 
among the first) to embark upon a particular action […] pioneering or preemptive 
moves in areas of business strategy, ranging from new products and technology 
to new advertising themes and positioning.” Subsequently, first mover advan-
tages are considered the ability of pioneering firms to earn positive economic 
profits (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Thus, a follower strategy in line 
with the imitation strategy of Bolton (1993) is a company’s delay in adopting a 
new product or practice. In contrast with most other studies in the field we define 
first movers and followers as strategies, not strategic positions. Therefore, a first 
mover in our context is not a company that actually pioneers in a new segment 
but all companies strongly emphasizing an innovation strategy of being first in 
the industry to introduce new products. Additionally, we define followers not as 
prospective the first movers that came in second behind the actual pioneer but as 
companies indicating explicitly that their prime innovation strategy is to react 
upon a competitor’s move. 
 
As stated initially, there is an ongoing discussion on whether pioneering firms 
can reap the benefits of their first mover advantages or to put it differently if they 
merely incur first mover disadvantages compared to follower firms. While this 
paper sidesteps this particular issue, it does aim to shed some light on the mecha-
nisms behind the strategic choice of being a first mover or a follower. Still, one 
can not fully comprehend this strategic decision without a clearer understanding 
of the nature of the respective advantages of first movers and followers. Hence, 
those shall be outlined briefly. 
 
In essence, companies decide to be first movers because such a strategy can be 
profitable by creating either a monopoly (blockaded entry) or a subtle implemen-
tation makes its replication unprofitable for latecomers ( Caves, 1984).  In the 
same context Chan Kim and Mauborgne (2004) coin the term “blue ocean” strat-
egy for firms flourishing in uncontested market spaces as opposed to operating in 
“red oceans,” the colors of which have changed through the “bloodshed” caused 
by fierce competition. The resource-based theory of the firm offers also an im-
portant stream of literature on incentives or barriers to imitation that includes 
timing decisions (first moves) as one component among others. Apart from first 
mover advantages, this literature emphasizes impediments to factor accumula-
tion, social complexity, causal ambiguity, tacit knowledge, economies of scale 
and scope, and adjustment costs (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; 
Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Rivkin, 2000). In contrast to this rather broad ap-
proach we narrow our analysis to the particular timing decisions. Nevertheless, 4 
we acknowledge that some of the subsequent reasoning could also be grounded 
in resource-based theory. Still, we decided to concentrate on the core concern of 
our analysis (the choice between a first mover and a follower strategy) instead of 
raising the larger imitation question. 
 
Hence, we derive the primary sources of first mover advantages based on 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988): 
 
–  Technological leadership 
First mover advantages can arise in the form of learning curve effects and 
subsequent lower costs (Golder and Tellis, 1993) or through patents that give 
a company a temporary monopoly in utilizing a new technology. 
 
–  Preemption of scarce assets 
First movers may be able to forestall acquisitions of important input factors, 
locations in geographic space, product characteristics or investments in plants 
and equipment, as exemplified by Schmalensee (1978) on product space pre-
emption or Schmanske (2004) for the golf course industry. 
 
–  Switching costs and buyer choice under uncertainty 
First movers benefit from switching costs since followers have to deploy ad-
ditional resources to lure customers away from pioneers. This allows pioneers 
to lock in their customers (Golder and Tellis, 1993). Additionally, first mover 
firms might establish a strong brand loyalty early or position their product as 
prototypical, i.e., the pioneer becomes strongly associated with the category, 
exemplified by Kleenex (Carpenter and Nakamoto, 1994). Under buyer un-
certainty1 the additional search costs might not justify the switching of a cus-
tomer to a superior but later entered brand (Lowe and Atkins, 1994). Ries and 
Trout (1986) show that this brand positioning can have lasting effects: 20 out 
of 25 leading brands in 1923 were still leaders in the 1980s. These reputa-
tional advantages are particularly relevant in service industries. In essence, as 
Kerin et al. (1992) describe, first movers might be able to shape customer 
preferences, while later entrants may have to accept them as given. 
 
–  Signaling effects to shareholders 
The announcement of product innovations leads to an increase in shareholder 
value for the innovating firm, while it induces negative effects on the valua-
                                              
1   In this paper we talk about different types of uncertainty: Here the concept of buyer uncertainty, i.e. 
the uncertainty of a customer if the new product will satisfy his needs as well as the product he previ-
ously used, is introduced. Another concept of uncertainty is market uncertainty, representing the un-
certainty about the market potential of an innovation. In what follows we focus on technological un-
certainty, i.e. the uncertainty whether an innovation activity will actually lead to an invention or in-
novation.  5 
tion of industry rivals (Lee et al., 2000; Akhigbe, 2002). Hence, shareholders 
welcome the prospect of new revenue streams and subsequently improve the 
company’s position in accessing external capital. 
 
Naturally, first mover disadvantages and follower advantages are deeply inter-
twined. Therefore a presentation of the latter should be sufficient (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988): 
 
–  “Free ride” on first mover investments 
As Mansfield et al. (1981) find in their analysis on imitation activities “the ra-
tio of imitation cost to innovation cost was on average 0.65, and the ratio of 
the imitation time to the innovation time was about 0.70.” Additionally, 
Guasch and Weiss (1980) point out that early entrants into a market make it 
easier to assess the productivity of workers through their hiring decisions and 
thereby improving the corresponding distribution of labor for all participants. 
Hence, there is a rationale of leaving R&D expenditures, buyer education and 
infrastructure development to the first mover, while later entrants exploit the 
benefits of their investments, too. This is especially true if co-investments of 
the buyers of new products are needed in order to be able to use the innova-
tions efficiently. 
 
–  Resolution of technological and market uncertainty 
Moving first into a new market involves considerable risks. Jensen (2003) ar-
gues that leading innovative firms might be better off waiting and learning 
from first movers’ experiences instead of choosing early adoption. Primarily 
in the absence of a dominant design (Christensen et al., 1998), latecomers 
might find it easier to “leapfrog” pioneers through superior product or service 
quality (Bryman, 1997). The same logic applies to shifts in technology or cus-
tomer needs. 
 
–  Incumbent inertia 
Bound by sunk cost investments, the fear to cannibalize existing products or 
breaking up established organizational structures, first movers might become 
less responsive to market needs than later entrants. Still, this should not nec-
essarily be misinterpreted as sluggishness it can also be a rational, profit-
maximizing strategy (Tang, 1988). Still, in the words of Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1984) they may become vulnerable to a strategic “Fat-Cat Effect” instead of 
displaying a “Lean and Hungry Look.” 
 
Extensive research has been conducted in the field of game theory on whether 
first mover advantages outweigh follower advantages or vice versa.  Gal-Or 
(1985) shows that first movers will only realize higher profits if the reaction 
curves of its followers are negatively sloped. If this is not the case (i.e., their re-6 
action curves are upwards sloped) first movers and followers act on so-called 
strategic complements; the followers will then earn higher profits. Aoki (1998) 
adds that this follower advantage becomes less inevitable if respective invest-
ment levels among rival firms are included. Henkel (2002) elaborates on the case 
of strategic complements and suggests that firms should commit only partially by 
choosing a de  facto role between first and second mover; generating  (in his 
words) a “1.5
th –mover advantage.” 
 
As stated before, the purpose of this paper is not to explain whether pioneers or 
followers are better off deploying their respective strategies. Instead, we want to 
shed more light on the mechanisms that lead companies to choose a first mover 
or a follower strategy. While these two topics are necessarily strongly connected, 
the former has certainly gained more attention thus far, we also want to contrib-
ute to a more in-depth, econometrically grounded understanding of the latter. 
 
The literature on first movers has not only identified the potential advantages 
and disadvantages of moving first, but also the specific factors at the firm or in-
dustry level that either hamper the realization of these advantages or leverage 
them.2 Assuming that firms know what factors are important in realizing first 
mover advantages, they will decide to be first movers only if they think their re-
sources and capabilities fit the requirements of being successful as a first mover 
in their industry. Naturally, the firm environment also plays an important role for 
the entry decision (Kerin et al., 1992). In light of this, a firm’s strategic decision 
to be a first mover or a follower can be explained by the factors outlined in the 
following section. 
 
Spillovers, absorptive capacity and appropriability 
 
We argue that a firm will be less likely to choose a first mover strategy if the 
level of outgoing spillovers
3 - i.e., the amount of knowledge spilling over to (po-
tential) competitors  -  is high.  If “learning-by-watching”  is prevalent  (Bolton, 
1993) it will be easier for a follower to imitate the product or processes of the 
first mover or to learn from mistakes made by the first mover (Mellahi and John-
son, 2000). As a consequence the expected profitability of being a follower in-
creases. In addition, with a high level of spillover learning curve effects can no 
longer be regarded as a high entry barrier for followers (Lowe and Atkins, 1994) 
                                              
2   See Kerin et al. (1992) for an excellent overview of the various factors leading to first mover advan-
tages and those factors hampering them. 
3   Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) we use the term “outgoing spillovers” for the amount of 
knowledge spilling over to other actors and the term “incoming spillovers” for the amount of knowl-
edge a firm is able to assimilate and use from external sources. 7 
because the follower firms can more easily benefit from learning curve effects 
achieved by the first mover.4 
The level of outgoing spillovers is essentially determined by the effectiveness 
of appropriability mechanisms for knowledge generated within a firm, such as 
secrecy. If these protection methods are efficient, less knowledge will be avail-
able to competitors per se. Appropriability is usually discussed in the context of 
patents. Patents are, however, not always the most effective method of protecting 
knowledge and creating entry barriers for firms. Mansfield et al. (1981) show 
that 60% of the 48 patented innovations in their sample had been imitated within 
four years. Nonetheless some authors argue that patent protection is important in 
generating (e.g., Lowe and Atkins, 1994; Cremers, 2004) and sustaining (e.g., 
Bresnahan, 1985) first mover advantages. Among other protection methods, a 
high degree of patent protection by firms can thus be regarded as a motive to 
moving first. 
The determinant of the level of incoming spillovers is the firm’s “absorptive 
capacity”5, i.e. the ability to use and profit from external knowledge available 
through market research, publications, mobility of the workforce, or other chan-
nels. If a significant amount of knowledge is available in a certain industry but 
the corresponding firms do not have the capability of assimilating and using it, 
the positive effect of high outgoing spillovers on the profitability of being a fol-
lower in that industry will be weaker. These absorptive capacities might be the 
result of experience driven learning, which is typically closely related firm age. 
 
Technological uncertainty and incumbent inertia 
 
A first mover is more likely to profit from its pioneering position if technologi-
cal uncertainty in its sector is high. Christensen et al. (1998) investigate the rigid 
disk drive industry and find that firms which target new technological areas 
(which can be characterized by higher technological uncertainty) are more likely 
to succeed than those entering a market after a dominant design has been estab-
lished.  
In contrast Kerin et al. (1992) reason that the rate of technological change de-
creases first mover benefits because the first movers’ cost advantages which are 
based on past experience and learning effects of currently sold products, will be-
come obsolete faster. The window of opportunity to reap the benefits of being 
first in the market for a new product is shorter if the life cycle of the product is 
shorter. Then again, this mechanism also reduces the time span in which a fol-
lower can operate successfully in that market segment. In contrast, Wernerfelt 
                                              
4   For more on the role of learning and entry barriers see Spence (1981). 
5   Cohen and Levinthal (1989), p. 569: “[…] the firm’s ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit 
knowledge from the environment [is] what we call a firm’s ‘learning’ or ‘absorptive’ capacity.” 8 
and Karnani (1984) argue that technological uncertainty increases the probability 
of choosing a follower strategy. They write that it is generally more risky to 
move first than to follow, stating that “… the greater the degree of uncertainty in 
the situation, the greater is the incentive to wait.” (p. 43). Consequently, firms in 
industries characterized by  high  (technological) uncertainty should be more 
likely to choose a follower strategy than firms in more stable industries, with less 
uncertainty. Mellahi and Johnson (2000) also shed some light on the problems 
market uncertainty may cause for first movers. They state that investing in a new 
market involves the risk of betting on the wrong horse, as a failed investment 
might have repercussions on their current market share and profits. Again, in-
creasing market uncertainty raises the incentive to wait due to the higher risks of 
failure involved. 
“Incumbent inertia” is also seen as a deterrent to adopting a first mover strategy 
if uncertainty is high, as it “… inhibits the ability of a firm [first mover] to re-
spond to environmental change…” (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). How-
ever, this is mainly a problem for firms which are already operating as first mov-
ers in a certain market as mentioned above. 
 
Dynamic economies of scale and size 
As previously stated, first movers advantages can arise in the form of learning 
curve effects and subsequent lower costs (Golder and Tellis, 1993). Thus, a firm 
should be more likely to choose a first mover strategy if it can realize scale ad-
vantages after entering a new market. Kerin et al. (1992) support this view, writ-
ing that first movers might be able to achieve cost advantages over followers, 
which depend on scale, if they preemptively invest in capacity. In addition, by 
investing in additional capacity first movers also raise the entry barrier for fol-
lowers, which might not be willing to invest at the large scale required. If pre-
emptive capacity investment is possible and profitable for a firm, it will be more 
likely to choose to move first. In practice, however, the evidence that preemptive 
investment in plant and equipment resources poses an entry barrier is incloncu-
sive.6 
In most cases, firm size has an influence on its strategy. This is also the case for 
its entry decision, as Lowe and Atkins (1994) have shown. They conclude that 
small firms have an incentive to be first movers if scale economies are to be ex-
pected in the market they are appraising. Small firms simply might not be able to 
enter the market late if the minimum required scale is too high. However, Lowe 
and Atkins (1994) note that despite first mover advantages small firms might 
have over larger firms (such as flexibility and lower overheads), the competitive 
environment sometimes leads them to adopt a follower strategy instead. 
                                              
6   See Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) for a more detailed discussion. 9 
Note that Lowe and Atkins (1994) only investigate firms with 100 employees 
or less. Compared to the overall size structure of firms in large countries like 
Germany, all of these firms could still be considered relatively small. In our opin-
ion the results would change if firms of all sizes were considered. We hypothe-
size that larger firms are more likely to be first movers because they can generate 
larger economies of scale and better share the risk of failure due to their partici-
pation in different markets. 
Industry vs. firm effects 
Most of the arguments presented above focus on the influence the industry has 
on a firms’ decision be a first mover. However, the different aspects discussed 
are also relevant at the firm-level. To make this clear, consider the following ex-
ample: A firm is operating in an industry characterized by a high level of spill-
overs. We argued before that this should lead firms to be followers instead of 
leaders. Now suppose that, relative to the industry, the level of spillovers re-
ceived by the firm in question is higher than the industry average. In this case the 
firm might still opt to be a first mover because it can make better use of external 
knowledge and can, for example, reduce uncertainty more effectively than other 
firms. If the resources and competencies of the firm did not matter for the entry 
decision, all firms in an industry  would  choose the same strategy, which is 
clearly not the case. A similar case can be made for the other motives for becom-
ing a first mover or follower.  
 
Therefore, we suggest an interesting interplay between the company and the in-
dustry it operates in. While every company in an industry has unique features, 
competencies and capabilities, most of the firms in an industry face similar inter-
nal and external forces (Farrell, 2004). Not surprisingly, the industry has a sig-
nificant influence on the variance of profitability among firms (McGahan and 
Porter, 1997). With that in mind we ask: is the choice between becoming a first 
mover or a follower born out of operational effectiveness or strategy? While the 
former means “performing similar activities better than rivals”, the latter implies 
the “creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activi-
ties” (Porter, 1996). Zander and Kogut (1995) show that the replication of new 
knowledge in the absence of an adequate social community is difficult. McEvily 
and Chakravarthy (2002) reason that the complexity, tacitness and specifity of 
technological knowledge prevent the imitation of product improvements. Hence, 
given complexity, tacitness and specifity exist, a firm could achieve a competi-
tive advantage compared to its industry counterparts even if they operate under 
similar structures and circumstances. In this line Rivkin (2000) points out that 
“would-be imitators could understand most of the ingredients that make up a 
successful business system yet still fail to grasp the recipe.” He also concludes 
that the combination of a complex strategy and limits on what managers know 10 
about rivals and their capabilities raises the barriers to imitation and that compa-
nies trying to copy complete strategies from successful competitors face severe 
penalties for small mistakes. 
 
In our empirical analysis we will try to disentangle the effects of industry and 
firm characteristics and determine  the importance of both.  We use a concept 
called “preventive appropriability” in this section to account for the effects of 
complexity, tacitness and specifity. Based on the argument presented above we 
expect this concept to have a positive influence on the decision to choose a first 
mover strategy. However, whether operational effectiveness propels first mover 
or follower strategies remains to be seen. We try to draw a clearer picture on this 
issue by separating the relative industry performance of a firm in three functional 
areas: Absorptive capacities, cost cutting and R&D. 
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3  Data and Empirical implementation 
For the empirical part of this paper we use data from a survey on the innovation 
behavior in Germany called the “Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)”. The sur-
vey is conducted by the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) on be-
half of the German ministry for education and research every year. The method-
ology and questionnaire of the survey, which is targeted at enterprises with at 
least five employees, is comparable to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
conducted every four years by Eurostat. For our analysis we use the 2003 survey 
in which data was collected on the innovation behaviour of enterprises during the 
three year period 2000-2002. About 4,000 firms in manufacturing and services 
responded to the survey and provided information on their innovation activities.7  
 
In 2003, the detailed data gathered on the innovation strategies of firms allowed 
us to generate the two key variables for our analysis, namely “firstmover” and 
“follower”, which are defined as follows8: 
 
Firstmover: This variable takes the value one if the firm in question indicated 
that its innovation strategy in 2000-2002 was being its industry leader in the in-
troduction of new products or services. It is zero otherwise. 
 
Follower: This variable takes the value one if the respective firm indicated that 
its innovation strategy in 2000-2002 was reacting to innovations of competitors. 
It is zero otherwise.9 
 
As was already mentioned, this is a unique approach; we do not model whether 
a firm actually was a first mover or a follower, but rather whether its strategy was 
to be a first mover or a follower. Hence, previous work on timing decisions rea-
soning from a strategic position perspective necessarily finds a single pioneer 
while everybody else in the market is a follower. This is not the case in our ana-
lysis. Here companies choose a first mover or a follower strategy, while it is also 
perfectly feasible for them to assign no high importance to timing in their innova-
tion strategies. Besides, in the theoretical part of the paper we have treated the 
two strategies first mover and follower as mutually exclusive strategies. This is 
certainly the case with respect to a certain product or field of technology. The 
innovation survey uses the subject approach however, meaning that we cannot 
analyse specific innovations but rather multi-product firms. Thus, a firm can fol-
                                              
7   For a more detailed description of the survey see Janz et al. (2001). 
8   The exact definition of all the variables can be found in the annex. 
9   The exact question was: “Towards what did your enterprise in the years 2000-2002 orientate its inno-
vation strategy?” Among the possible answers were “Leader in the introduction of new prod-
ucts/services” and “Reaction to the innovations of competitors” 12 
low both strategies at the same time, as it can be a follower in one product seg-
ment and a leader in another. Consequently we include two dependent dummy 
variables in our model and opt for a bivaritate probit technique. 
 
To analyze the determinants of this strategic choice, we generate additional 
variables for each group of determinants proposed by related literature (see pre-
vious section).10  
 
For the group “spillovers, appropriability and absorptive capacity”, we use sev-
eral indicators. 
The first one is a knowledge spillover variable which captures the importance 
of external knowledge sources for the  performance of  a firm’s  innovations 
(measured as the share of turnover generated through innovative impulses from 
customers, suppliers or competitors). In order to be able to distinguish the influ-
ence of the industry in which the firm is operating and the influence of firm char-
acteristics, knowledge spillovers were investigated at the industry level11, i.e., the 
average importance of spillovers in the industry was introduced (indubusispills) 
as well as the firm level. For the firm level variable we did not use the absolute 
importance of knowledge flows but the relative importance, we divided the abso-
lute importance a firm assigned to spillovers by the average importance of spill-
overs in the industry (quotbusispills). Consequently a firm which values knowl-
edge spillovers more than the industry average will have a value higher than one, 
while other firms will have a value less than one. The rationale for looking at the 
relative position instead of the absolute value is that we think that the probability 
of choosing a first mover or follower strategy in a given industry is more likely to 
be high if the respective firm is superior in some regard to the average firm. 
For this variable a problem arises: the problem of endogeneity. We model the 
variable capturing the relative importance of knowledge spillovers for a firm as 
an endogenous variable because we have reason to believe that, first of all an 
above average value for this variable should influence the concerned firm’s deci-
sion to lead or follow and secondly, if a firm has chosen a first mover or follower 
strategy, this should influence the  importance  the firm assigns to knowledge 
spillovers. Since we use cross-sectional data we can not disentangle the two ef-
fects. 
Two other variables used for this group measure the importance of formal (le-
gal_prot) and informal protection methods (prev_prot) for innovation.12 This is a 
direct measure of appropriability. In the absence of adequate data for 2003 we 
constructed these variables from the 2001 innovation survey at the industry level. 
                                              
10  The exact description of the variables can be found in the Annex. 
11  To generate the industry level variables we group certain NACE-Classes together. For a complete list 
of all NACE Classes included see the Annex, Section 6.2. 
12  Schmidt (2005) has shown that it makes sense to keep these two groups separate. 13 
This procedure appears suitable because the importance of different protection 
measures should have remained relatively stable from an industry perspective. 
This explicit assumption should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
Further, these appropriability variables are not subject to endogeneity concerns 
because of the given time structure. 
Finally, in order to be able to investigate the influence of absorptive capacity 
we again constructed a relative measure (quotR&D) dividing the amount a firm 
spent on R&D in 2002 by the average amount a firm in the industry spent on 
R&D in the same year. Again, we argue that this variable is endogenous because 
we presume that, depending on the strategy a firm chooses, it will (have to) in-
vest more or less in R&D; a high level of R&D spending might influence this 
strategic choice. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) found that the follower (in their 
terminology the “challenger”) spends more on R&D than the leader (“incum-
bent”) 
 
The group “technological uncertainty and the product life cycle” is only repre-
sented in the estimation equation by one i ndustry level variable, the average 
amount spent on R&D in a firm’s industry (induavgR&D). We argue that the 
greater the technological uncertainty the more R&D is necessary.13  
 
The third group of determinants can be summarized under “Economies of scale 
and size”. Here we assume that the level of cost reduction through process inno-
vation is a good measure of the significance of scale economies. We again gener-
ate a variable for the industry level of cost reduction (inducostred) and for the 
firm-level (quotcostred). The firm level variable is treated as an endogenous vari-
able. The ability of a firm to operate at competitive cost levels and hence prices is 
a central ingredient to any strategic choice. Nevertheless, the direction of this 
relationship remains ambiguous; i.e., whether a firm’s cost position enables a 
certain strategic choice or if it is, in fact, the result of the strategy. To illustrate 
the latter, a first move might allow a firm to realize economies of scale and drive 
down costs to generate entry barriers for followers. Size is measured directly as 
the natural logarithm of the number of employees (size, size^2). 
Two more variables which try to capture the “interaction” among the strategic 
decisions of first movers and followers were used in the regression analysis. In 
line with the game-theoretical argument from Gal-Or (1985) we would expect 
that a follower strategy is always preferable in the presence of an existing first 
mover and strategic complements. Then again, relying on the same reasoning on 
strategic complements the presence of followers in an industry should deter first 
movers. We introduced two additional variables to test this hypothesis: the per-
centage of firms in an industry that adopt a first mover strategy (relfirstmover) 
                                              
13  There was a question regarding the product life cycle in the survey, but the item non-response was 
too high to compute the average product life cycle for a number of industries, especially in services. 14 
and the percentage of followers in an industry (relfollower).14 It remains to be 
seen whether firms can actually recognize a competitor’s entry strategy, whether 
this influences their own decisions and whether they actually operate under stra-
tegic complements. 
As an additional variable a dummy indicating if the respective firm is situated 
in Eastern Germany  (east) is used. Previous studies using the MIP data have 
shown that there are still differences in the innovation behavior of Eastern and 
Western German firms.  
 
So far we have largely discussed the endogeneity challenge from a conceptual 
point of view. In statistical terms15 this means that economic data reflect a sys-
tem of economic relations that are dynamic, stochastic, and simultaneous. Espe-
cially the simultaneous aspect is of importance in our case. As indicated before, 
some of our variables are characterized by joint, interdependent, endogenous in-
stantaneous feedback attributes. Hence, these variables are correlated with the 
error term and a simple application of the least squares rule would not yield un-
biased estimators. In general, this result would still allow an assessment in the 
sense of “if one factor is present, so is the other” without a clear indication on the 
direction between cause and effect. To address this shortcoming and to ensure 
that we actually measure the effect of our explanatory variables on the strategy 
decision and not the other way around, we devised a two-step procedure. This 
technique also improves the consistency of the estimation. In essence, this ap-
proach is superior to its single-step counterpart since it allows more precise pre-
dictions and conclusions. 
It is subsequently presented in more detail. We design a two-step estimation 
procedure including instrument variables that are highly correlated with the en-
dogenous variables but not with the dependent variable. Hence, in the first step 
we regress the endogenous variables on all the exogenous variables (including 
the instruments) and use the resulting predicted values in the second stage. On 
the first step we also encounter censoring of our dependent variables (quotbusis-
pills, quotcostred, quotR&D). Accordingly, we estimated three separate tobit 
models to tackle this issue.16 The instruments we used for the endogenous vari-
ables are:  
-  turnover per employee in 2001 (Salesperempl01)  
-  share of employees with higher education (Grads01) 
-  a dummy variable for “continuous R&D” (R&Dcon) 
-  amount spent on R&D in 2001 (R&D01) 
                                              
14  To account for potential problems with endogeneity of these variables they were constructed as an 
industry ratio excluding the reporting firm itself. 
15  For an introduction to this topic see Griffiths et al. (1993). 
16  Greene (1993). 15 
-  a dummy variable indicating that the firm perceived a lack of appropriate 
sources of finance as a hampering factor for innovation (Obstaclefinance) 
-  a dummy variable indicating that the firm perceived a lack of qualified per-
sonnel as a hampering factor for innovation (Obstaclestaff) 
-  a dummy variable indicating that the firm perceived a lack of information 
on technology as a hampering factor for innovation (Obstacletech) 
 
As already mentioned, we use the MIP survey to generate the different vari-
ables. Item non-response for certain questions was fairly high, especially because 
non-innovating firms were not asked innovation related questions, including 
questions on innovation strategies. However, 2,279 out of the 4,428 surveyed 
firms provided answers to all the questions we needed to construct the variables 
mentioned above. Of these 2,279 firms, 254 indicated they intend to be a first 
mover and 105 to be a follower; all other companies assigned no high importance 
to either of these two innovation strategies.17  
 
The decisions to adopt a first mover or a follower strategy are not independent 
of one another. In some cases it might be possible for a firm to choose both 
strategies, such as when it is operating in multiple industries (we found some of 
these cases in the data). Typically however, a firm will have to choose between 
the two. To model this link between the two decisions adequately we used a 
bivariate probit model instead of estimating the equations for each strategy sepa-
rately. The bivariate probit model is directly derived from the standard probit 
model while allowing more than one equation with correlated disturbances. This 
technique is quite comparable to the seemingly unrelated regressions model. Es-
timating both equations simultaneously allows us to improve the estimated sam-
pling precision and subsequently a more complete usage of the available infor-














where x is the vector of dependent variables presented above and includes the 
predicted values of the endogenous variables from the first stage regressions. 
                                              
17  Additional descriptive statistics can be found in the Annex. 
18  For a more in depth description of the bivariate probit procedure see Greene (1993). 16 
4  Results 
Our empirical analysis reveals some interesting insights; Table 1 summarizes 
the main results.19 We find a more complex connection between firm size and the 
strategic decision to move first than Lowe and Atkins (1994) suggest. The likeli-
hood of choosing a first mover strategy increases as the number of employees 
grows, but decreases again after a certain threshold has been crossed. Subse-
quently, the first mover strategy is less likely for both exceedingly small and 
large enterprises, while we find no significant connection between firm size and 
the decision to deploy a follower strategy. 
Interestingly enough, we find no significant evidence that firms choose a par-
ticular first mover or follower strategy based on the choices of their counterparts 
in the industry. Still, from our results we can not conclude whether these compa-
nies do not face strategic complements, whether they can not observe the strate-
gies of other firms in the industry or whether these choices are simply not a fac-
tor in their own strategic decision processes. 
With an eye on the specific situation of Germany it comes as a surprise that 
even twelve years after re-unification, a company located in the Eastern part of 
Germany is significantly more likely to adopt a follower strategy, while compa-
nies from Western Germany exhibit an increased likelihood of becoming first 
movers. This result is especially noteworthy since it displays neither a firm nor 
industry specific aspect but rather a regional one. We argue that Eastern German 
firms still find themselves in a catching-up process resembling the post-war ex-
periences of Japan, Western Germany or South Korea. During such rebuilding 
periods firms might be more inclined to rely on tried and proven concepts and 
technologies (hence follower strategies) to close the gaps with Western competi-
tors instead of bearing the additional risks of a first mover strategy. 
 
Table 1: Regression results for bivariate probit estimations of the probability to 
choose a first mover or a follower strategy in the introduction of product innova-
tions (2-Step procedure) 
Definitions  Variables  Firstmover  Follower 
Firm-level       
Absorptive capacity for business spillovers  Quotbusispills  1.790 *** (I)  -2.068 *** (I) 
    (0.449)  (0.945) 
Excellence in cutting costs  Quotcostred  -0.025 * (I)  0.060 *** (I) 
    (0.014)  (0.017) 
Relative strength in R&D activities  QuotR&D  0.022 *** (I)  0.033 (I) 
    (0.006)  (0.027) 
                                              
19  The effects of the two step procedure on the results can be found in Table 3 of the appendix. 17 
Definitions  Variables  Firstmover  Follower 
Company age in years  Age  0.003  0.003 
    (0.002)  (0.002) 
Number of employees (in logs)  Ln empl  0.295 ***  0.061 
    (0.109)  (0.113) 
Squared number of employees (in logs)  Ln empl, 
squared 
-0.024 **  -0.009 
    (0.011)  (0.012) 
Location in former Eastern Germany  East  -0.222 **  0.296 ** 
    (0.101)  (0.132) 
Industry-level       
Intensity of preventive appropriability  Prev_prot  5.624 ***  -3.404 
    (2.023)  (2.940) 
Intensity of formal appropriability  Legal_prot  -4.340  2.685 
    (2.688)  (3.832) 
Share of companies with first mover strategies  Relfirstmover  -0.024  -0.008 
    (0.019)  (0.026) 
Share of companies with follower strategies  Relfollower  0.012  -0.008 
    (0.028)  (0.035) 
Intensity of knowledge spillovers from business 
sources 
Indubusispills  0.703 ***  -0.622 
    (0.337)  (0.455) 
Importance of cost reductions (economies of scale)  Inducostred  -0.011  0.035 
    (0.017)  (0.021) 
Level of technological uncertainty  InduavgR&D  -0.001  0.002 
    (0.001)  (0.002) 
Constant  Constant  -5.917 ***  3.918 
    (1.383)  (2.505) 
  Observations  2274 
  X^2  406.53 
  Loglikelihood  -958.53 
  Rho  0.230 *** 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%  
(I) Instrumented 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
One of the major goals of this analysis was to distinguish between firm and in-
dustry effects on this particular strategic choice. The industry variables shall be 
considered first. In line with our theoretical reasoning, we find that technological 
uncertainty in an industry is not a reliable predictor of first mover or follower 
strategies. On the one hand, it opens up windows of opportunity for first movers 
but it also increases the individual danger of failure from a “going it alone” strat-
egy.  18 
While the respective literature led us to believe that intensive knowledge spill-
overs within an industry would make entry barriers gained through first mover 
strategies less defendable thereby making such strategies less attractive, we find 
quite the opposite. There is a significant positive relationship between first mover 
strategic choices and the intensity of knowledge spillovers from the private sector 
in an industry, while the relationship with the adoption of follower strategies is 
significantly negative. We conclude from this fact that first movers prefer an in-
dustry environment where extensive knowledge s haring enables skill and r e-
source development. Still, the argument of fading first mover advantages through 
rapid knowledge exchange might be better described in the context of the market 
and not necessarily the industry. In the absence of any meaningful market defini-
tion information we decided to use the industry as a proxy, but this concept might 
be too broad. Cost reductions at the industry level showed no significant impact. 
Additionally, we were surprised to find that formal protection measures of in-
tellectual property in an industry had no significant influence on the strategic de-
cision under consideration. While the findings of Mansfield et al. (1981) suggest 
such a result for the first mover decision, we had expected that any form of intel-
lectual property protection (legal or otherwise) would deter followers. This is not 
the case. Hence, the weight assigned to the topic of appropriability through pat-
ents in entry strategy decisions appears to be at least overstated or highly case 
sensitive. Still, as the literature suggests, preventive protection measures like se-
crecy and complexity of design enable first movers to keep their learning proprie-
tary and thus propel this strategic choice. We argue that when choosing a first 
mover strategy, firms might not be willing to accept the associated costs and 
knowledge spill-outs of patenting but rather use cheaper and more flexible pre-
ventive protection measures. 
Then again, the influence of knowledge spillovers and preventive appropriabil-
ity on first mover strategies has been investigated separately thus far. The use of 
any form of protection instruments in an industry, though, should confine the 
flow of knowledge and therefore prove counterproductive for spillovers. Never-
theless, we find a positive relationship  between  both factors  and  first mover 
strategies. However, this argument largely rests on the assumption that the vol-
ume of a knowledge flow is a good proxy for its importance. Small pieces of in-
formation, when collected proficiently and interpreted adequately, might actually 
prove far more valuable than large, meaningless quantities. Therefore, we meas-
ure knowledge spillovers in terms of their importance and relevance to their re-
cipients (share of turnover). While this concept reflects the value for the recipi-
ent, our measure of preventive appropriability does the same for the sources of 
spillovers. It covers the importance of preventive protection activities in an in-
dustry but not their effectiveness. Hence, we find that companies in these indus-
tries realize the value of the knowledge embodied in their company and their 
product and go to great lengths to protect it, but not to the degree to which they 
actually succeed. Consequently, we identify two sides of the same coin; it should 19 
not come as a surprise that they show both a positive impact on the decision to 
choose a first mover strategy. First movers operate in industries with extensive 
knowledge spillovers where the term “extensive” should not be narrowly inter-
preted as “provided in large quantities”, but as “valuable” in the sense that they 
hold extensive possibilities of generating economic value. 
 
Moving away from an industry perspective we find many more firm-specific 
factors in the decision processes of companies on product entry strategies. Fol-
lowing the afore mentioned argument that first movers tend to operate in indus-
tries with extensive knowledge flows, we find that those first movers are signifi-
cantly more adapt to utilize and benefit from such spillovers. Obviously, they are 
better prepared to learn from their respective environments and leverage the 
know-how they obtain in this manner than their industry counterparts. What is 
more, the significantly enhanced value of R&D expenditures points towards a 
firm-specific relationship between absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989;1990) and the adoption of a first mover strategy. 
Firms that adopt a follower strategy find it significantly more difficult to lever-
age their knowledge environment. While their own R&D activities show no sig-
nificant impact on the strategic choice, their access to knowledge spillovers and 
their utilization of external knowledge spillovers is significantly below industry 
averages. Nevertheless, when it comes to economies of scale firms that show su-
perior performance in streamlining processes and cutting costs prefer a follower 
strategy while the opposite is true for first mover firms. Therefore, followers rely 
on lower costs and subsequent lower prices to overcome pioneering firms. 
In essence, the factors presented above lead us to believe that a firms chooses a 
first mover strategy because of superior capabilities in not only absorbing exter-
nal knowledge, but also combining this knowledge with existing expertise em-
bodied within the company and its organizational structure. These absorptive ca-
pacities allow it to reduce the risk of failure. On the contrary, firms that adopt a 
follower strategy lack these mechanisms. Instead, they rely on superior excel-
lence in cutting costs and streamlining processes. While this does not put them 
on the forefront of product innovation it allows them to realize meaningful eco-
nomic profits by competing on their operational excellence and efficiency once a 
pioneering firm has ventured a first move. 20 
5  Conclusions 
Moving away from the traditional question of whether first mover advantages 
are sustainable or not, we shed some light on the mechanisms behind the strate-
gic choices of firms between first mover or follower strategies. The project bene-
fited from the almost unique opportunity to identify strategies instead of strategic 
positions in a representative sample by especially allowing us to identify deliber-
ate followers instead of outstripped first movers. 
We find that firms that choose a first mover strategy operate in industries with 
intensive knowledge exchange, additionally  leveraging this advantage through 
excellent absorptive capacities. It might very well be that these companies find 
themselves on the forefront of innovation with no one else to wait for. 
On the follower side we identify companies that operate in industries with a 
lack of external knowledge spillovers to benefit from. This environment, in com-
bination with underdeveloped absorptive capacities, prevents them from going it 
alone and instead favors a “wait and see” approach. In order to compete, they do 
not so much rely on external information sources as on internal operational excel-
lence and efficiency. This allows them to compete on lower costs once an adven-
turous first mover has sufficiently reduced uncertainty in the industry. 
When our results are not completely in line with what other authors suggest, 
notably the relationship between knowledge spillovers and first movers and the 
insignificance of intellectual property protection through patents, it is most likely 
due to our specific setting. While most other studies observe actual pioneers in 
their respective field, we observe the companies that choose a strategy to become 
one (strategy vs. strategic position). Hence, we focus on a somewhat earlier stage 
where a prospective pioneer decides that she has the necessary technological and 
organizational expertise and courage to venture a first mover strategy. At that 
point, external knowledge spillovers and absorptive capabilities are a prerequisite 
facilitating such a strategy. Then again, once this first mover firm has actually 
achieved pioneering status - and we do not observe this situation - its focus may 
shift towards defending its competitive position which readily includes the pro-
tection of intellectual property and the suppression of knowledge spillovers to 
keep learning proprietary. 
While a first mover strategy appears to be more prestigious, there are good rea-
sons to go with a follower strategy. Firms with underdeveloped absorptive ca-
pacities but superior operational skills only act rationally when they decide to 
become smart followers instead of ill-equipped, hazardous first mover. Accord-
ingly, we argue that neither strategy is per se superior to the other. Instead, our 
findings are perfectly in line with the case from Bolton (1993), who portrays 
Japanese electronic giant Matsushita as a successful follower by “deliberately 
arriving late in the marketplace, competing successfully through an outstanding 21 
global distribution system and low-cost, high-quality production.” Hence, Matsu-
shita chooses a perhaps less celebrated but still sustainable strategy compared to 
its first moving rival Sony. 
Future work might pick up where we left it and consider whether choosing a 
first mover strategy that does not lead to the actual pioneer position might still be 
superior to a deliberate follower decision, or whether overtaken first movers are 
the quintessential losers in this race. Moreover, a unifying view on this strategy 
versus strategic position framework might also bring valuable insights. As stated 
previously, we also consider it necessary for the derivation of management rec-
ommendations to extend our approach from the analysis of actual practices to-
wards best practices. Still, we hope we have made a nice first move into this field 
and attract promising followers. 22 
6  Annex 
6.1  Variables 
a)  Dependent variables 
 
firstmover: One if the firms indicated that its innovation strategy in 2000-2002 was to 
be the industry leader in the introduction of new products or services. 
 
follower: One if the firm indicated that its innovation strategy in 2000-2002 was to 
react to innovations introduced by its competitors. 
 
b)  Exogenous variables at firm level 
 
quotbusispills: Quotient between index of importance of spillovers from business 
sources and industry average. 
 
quotcostred: Quotient between firm percentage of cost reduction and industry aver-
age.  
 
quotR&D: Quotient between firm expenditures on R&D and industry average. 
 
age: Age of the company in 2002 since founding in years. 
 
lnempl: Natural logarithm of number of employees in the year 2002 
 
lnempl^2: Natural logarithm of number of employees in the year 2002, squared 
 
east: One if the company is located in Eastern Germany 
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c)  Exogenous variables at industry level 
 
prev_prot: Sum of importance of strategic protection methods for innovations (se-
crecy, complexity of design and lead-time advantage). Rescaled between 0 (not used) 
and 1 (maximum usage). Industry average. 
 
legal_prot: Sum of importance of formal protection methods for innovations (patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, registration of design patterns). Rescaled between 0 (not used) 
and 1 (highly used). Industry average. 
 
relfirstmover: Percentage of firms in an industry which indicated that their innova-
tion strategy in 2000-2002 was to be their industry’s leader in the introduction of new 
products or processes, excluding the reporting firm itself. 
 
relfollower: Percentage of firms in an industry which indicated that their innovation 
strategy in 2000-2002 was to react to innovations introduced by their competitors, ex-
cluding the reporting firm itself. 
 
indubusispills:  Index of importance of customers, competitors and suppliers  as 
sources of innovations weighted by the share of turnover resulting from these sources. 
Industry average.  
 
inducostred: Industry reduction in costs due to process innovation in per cent. 
 
induavgR&D: Average industry expenditures for intramural R&D in million Euro in 
2002. 
 
d)  Instruments used in the first step tobit regressions 
 
R&Dcon: One if a firm indicated that it conducted R&D activities continuously be-
tween 2000 and 2002. 
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Grads01: Share of employees with higher education in 2001.  
 
R&D01: Firm’s expenditures for intramural R&D in million Euros in 2001. 
 
Salesperempl01:  Turnover per employee in million Euros in 2001. 
 
Obstaclefinance: One if a firm indicated that a lack of appropriate sources of finance 
was an obstacle to innovation in the years 2000 to 2002.  
 
Obstaclestaff: On, if a firm indicated that a lack of skilled labor was an obstacle to 
innovation in the years 2000 to 2002. 
 
Obstacletech: One if a firm indicated that a lack of information about technology was 
an obstacle to innovation in the years 2000 to 2002. 25 
6.2  Industries included 
Industry  NACE Code 
Mining and quarrying  10 – 14 
Food and Tobacco  15 – 16 
Textiles  and Leather  17 – 19 
Wood / Paper / Publishing  20 – 22 
Chemicals / Petroleum   23 – 24 
Plastic / Rubber   25 
Glass / Ceramics   26 
Metal   27 – 28 
Manufacture of machinery and equip-
ment 
29 
Manufacture of electrical machinery  30 – 32 
Medical, precision and optical instru-
ments 
33 
Manufacture of motor vehicles  34 – 35 
Manufacture of furniture, jewellery, 
sports equipment and toys 
36 – 37 
Electricity, gas and water supply  40 – 41 
Construction  45 
Retail and motor trade  50, 52 
Wholesale trade  51 
Transportation and Communication  60 – 63, 64.1 
Financial Intermediation  65 – 67 
Real Estate Activities and Renting  70 – 71 
ICT services  72, 64.2 
Technical services  73, 74.2, 74.3 
Consulting  74.1, 74.4 
Other business oriented services  74.5 – 74.8, 90 26 
6.3  Regression Results and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics 
a  
  Mean  Mean   Mean 
  Entire Sample   Firstmover  Follower 
Observations  2274  254  105 
% of total  -  11.2%  4.6% 
Quotbusispills  0.952  1.700  1.867 
  (0.763)  (1.192)  (1.266) 
Quotcostred  1.034  2.028  3.412 
  (11.908)  (9.303)  (12.465) 
QuotR&D  0.660  3.883  3.477 
  (7.505)  (20.369)  (18.936) 
Age  18.858  18.807  23.810 
  (19.565)  (19.644)  (28.141) 
Ln empl  3.819  4.772  5.012 
  (1.744)  (1.927)  (1.948) 
East  0.376  0.287  0.314 
  (0.484)  (0.453)  (0.466) 
Prev_prot  0.192  0.262  0.245 
(industry variable)  (0.113)  (0.115)  (0.120) 
Legal_prot  0.088  0.126  0.120 
(industry variable)  (0.063)  (0.069)  (0.070) 
Relfirstmover  13.514  17.558  16.419 
(industry variable)  (7.078)  (7.247)  (7.571) 
Relfollower  5.781  7.382  7.383 
(industry variable)  (3.109)  (3.218)  (2.979) 
Indubusispills  1.678  1.899  1.856 
(industry variable)  (0.387)  (0.425)  (0.431) 
Inducostred  4.231  5.700  6.003 
(industry variable)  (3.560)  (3.672)  (3.935) 
InduavgR&D  20.578  44.351  41.599 
(industry variable)  (53.055)  (74.853)  (72.126) 
a standard deviations in parenthesis 27 
Table 3: Regression Results for Bivariate-Probit Estimations of the Probability to 
choose a first mover or a follower strategy 
  Everything Exogenous  2-Step Procedure 
  Firstmover  Follower  Firstmover  Follower 
Firm-level variables         
Quotbusispills  0.497 ***  0.404 ***  1.790 *** (I)  -2.068 *** (I) 
  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.449)  (0.945) 
Quotcostred  0.001  0.004 **  -0.025 * (I)  0.060 *** (I) 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
QuotR&D  0.001  0.004 **  0.022 *** (I)  0.033 (I) 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.027) 
Age  -0.004 *  0.003  0.003  0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Ln empl  0.221 **  0.234 **  0.295 ***  0.061 
  (0.097)  (0.109)  (0.109)  (0.113) 
Ln empl, squared  -0.011  -0.012  -0.024 **  -0.009 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
East  -0.158 *  0.067  -0.222**  0.296 ** 
  (0.088)  (0.115)  (0.101)  (0.132) 
Industry-level variables         
Prev_prot  4.691 **  0.616  5.624 ***  -3.404 
  (1.826)  (2.547)  (2.023)  (2.940) 
Legal_prot  -3.160  3.037  -4.340  2.685 
  (2.520)  (3.472)  (2.688)  (3.832) 
Relfirstmover  -0.004  -0.016  -0.024  -0.008 
  (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.026) 
Relfollower  0.013  -0.019  0.012  -0.008 
  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.028)  (0.035) 
Indubusispills  0.056  0.074  0.703 ***  -0.622 
  (0.274)  (0.367)  (0.337)  (0.455) 
Inducostred  0.002  0.052 **  -0.011  0.035 
  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.021) 
IduavgR&D  0  -0.001  -0.001  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Constant  -3.210 ***  -3.489 ***  -5.917 ***  3.918 
  (0.363)  (0.481)  (1.383)  (2.505) 
Observations  2274  2274 
X^2  439.81  406.53 
Loglikelihood  -964.13  -985.53 
Rho  0.136 *  0.230 *** 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%  
(I) Instrumented; Robust standard errors in parentheses 28 
Table 4: First Step Tobit Regressions 
  Quotbusispills  Quotcostred  QuotR&D 
Age  0  0.019  -0.032 
  (0.001)  (0.046)  (0.020) 
Ln empl  0.012  3.33  -0.519 
  (0.032)  (2.121)  (0.85) 
Ln empl, squared  0.005 
 
0.002  0.306 *** 
  (0.004)  (0.211)  (0.084) 
East  0.018 
 
-2.269  -0.926 
  (0.032)  (2.219)  (0.897) 
Relfirstmover  0  -0.187  0.218 
  (0.007)  (0.455)  (0.184) 
Relfollower  0.009  -0.014  0.429 
  (0.010)  (0.69)  (0.294) 
Indubusispills  -0.501 ***  -2.062  -5.656 * 
  (0.115)  (7.272)  (2.956) 
Inducostred  -0.005  -0.199  0.063 
  (0.006)  (0.399)  (0.162) 
InduavgR&D  0.001**  -0.009  -0.010 
  0  (0.024)  (0.010) 
Legal_prot  2.179 **  90.491  -26.13 
  (0.94)  (62.509)  (26.502) 
Prev_prot  -1.242 *  -1.818  21.294 
  (0.686)  (45.217)  (19.067) 
R&Dcon  0.467 ***  15.468 ***  10.638 *** 
  (0.027)  (1.420)  (0.627) 
Grads01  0.003 ***  0.017  0.081 *** 
  (0.001)  (0.049)  (0.019) 
R&D01  -0.000 **  0  0.005 *** 
  (0)  (0.001)  0 
Salesperempl01  -0.014  0.599  -0.706 
  (0.022)  (1.545)  (0.716) 
Obstaclefinance  0.240 ***  14.992 ***  3.115 *** 
  (0.048)  (2.489)  (1.01) 
Obstaclestaff  0.224 ***  5.241 *  -0.07 
  (0.06)  (3.016)  (1.189) 
Obstacletech  0.013  1.765  4.020 *** 
  (0.072)  (3.603)  (1.372) 
Constant  1.385 ***  -56.879 ***  -20.666 *** 
  (0.139)  (8.971)  (3.652) 
Observations  2274  2274  2274 
X^2  592.58  402.09  1105.99 
Loglikelihood  -2350.001  -2517.015  -2642.933 
Share of censored observations  2.6%  80.5%  72.9% 
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